A question of paradox

[gray]

I ought to put this in, the one thing that has been drill into me through classes, and every researcher I've ever talked to, is that nothing is really 'fact' it's just the best guess we have based on the information we have at the time.

We call verified observations facts because worrying about otherwise (via solipsism or whathaveyou) is in general a waste of time.

Hmm, I believe this is a simple matter of opinion, I don't think arguing or debating about it would accomplish much, but as I see it, there is great value in questioning both the obscure and what we take for common knowledge. Of course, much of this comes form a philosophical standpoint as well.

 

[Kawamura]

We watch it occur. The observation is fact. How is that nonsensical?

The observation is fact, yes. That's not the theory, though. The theory is that diseases are caused by germs. We see germs. We see symptoms. We see certain symptoms go with certain germs. The theory ties all these observations together.

I think you missed the NAS excerpt in the link. I'm not the only one who disagrees with you.

Ignoring the time issue for one, the matter is sometimes we have direct and repeated observations of all steps that were theorized. Those observations are facts. No status as theories beforehand changes those observations magically into theory.

That... statement confuses me, the last sentence. I'm trying to think. No, the steps wouldn't be theory.

It seems that if we're capable of predicting what facts we should find, then that means we're using a scientific theory. Predictive power is part of it.

I looked at that link and it didn't seem particularly helpful to me. Unless I've been unclear, I've been saying that there is the fact of evolution and the theory of it. It's a fact that genes go through a toss up between generations. It's a fact that organisms come from previous organism. The theory takes those facts and makes up the mechanisms.

We also see mutations and preferential selection in the fitness of those mutations to breed - natural or artificial. The observations are magically theory, now?

They're certainly part of the theory and a major part.

We observe that a particle changes velocity when struck. We assign Newton's laws to these.

As you mentioned later, laws are less than theory: they tend to break down.

Because unobservable tampering is just Last Thursdayism. All IDers claim that evidence can be found, so it's not like there's any disagreement with the nuts there.

From your same book: "Creationism, intelligent design, and other claims of supernatural intervention in the origin of life or of species are not science because they are not testable by the methods of science."

I'm using the typical scientific definition. Eventually, some theories reach the point where you observe the root causes of the effects that they try to describe.

A hypothesis is something that makes a testable prediction about the Universe, okay.
A theory is a hypothesis that explains all previous observations and has successfully predicted observations on its own.
A fact is a data point - an observation.
A law is a collection of consistent observations with (at least originally) no theory to explain them.

My declaration of germ theory as fact is that we currently watch the underlying mechanism - typically, you might expect a theory to be an imperfect observation of the Universe. You might, for example, find evidence of panspermia mixing with terrestrial life or something that extends relativity under previously unobserved conditions.

No, I wouldn't. I think this is the problem I'm having. A scientific theory does not mean an imperfect view of the universe.

You can't really do that with germ theory, or the theory that the Earth orbits the Sun - assuming a sufficiently strict definition of orbit. It's not just that trying to contravene requires some absurd explanation, but it actually requires that our reality not be what it seems and that's not a very useful proposition. We measure the angular acceleration the Earth experiences, for example, as it orbits. Likewise, an alternative to germ theory needs to explain... the exact and entire process described by germ theory.

You keep using the word theory here. I don't see what the problem is. Germ theory of disease is a scientific theory. I can't imagine a way in which it couldn't be a scientific theory.

Relativity is a good case to look at. It did not supplant Newtonian mechanics - it explains that they dominate in most instances. That's why it's called relativity, as it follows that principle. We do not, however, have any understanding of the underlying mechanism.

And why is this a good case?

 

[Kawamura]

I ought to put this in, the one thing that has been drill into me through classes, and every researcher I've ever talked to, is that nothing is really 'fact' it's just the best guess we have based on the information we have at the time.

We call verified observations facts because worrying about otherwise (via solipsism or whathaveyou) is in general a waste of time.

Hmm, I believe this is a simple matter of opinion, I don't think arguing or debating about it would accomplish much, but as I see it, there is great value in questioning both the obscure and what we take for common knowledge. Of course, much of this comes form a philosophical standpoint as well.

Most scientists I've talked with recognize that, yes, they're not exactly facts and, yes, some weird shit could happen (like gravity suddenly failing), but they really, really don't care.

 

[gray]

We call verified observations facts because worrying about otherwise (via solipsism or whathaveyou) is in general a waste of time.[/quote]

Hmm, I believe this is a simple matter of opinion, I don't think arguing or debating about it would accomplish much, but as I see it, there is great value in questioning both the obscure and what we take for common knowledge. Of course, much of this comes form a philosophical standpoint as well.[/quote]

Most scientists I've talked with recognize that, yes, they're not exactly facts and, yes, some weird shit could happen (like gravity suddenly failing), but they really, really don't care.[/quote]

True, we could speculate upon possibilities all we want, but there is little merit to doing this, because if you can't trust some things at least, it is very hard to make further progress. Still, I do believe in Descartes process of finding information from the beginning.

 

[Carnal]

(I don't know why I do these rants...too much coffee I guess.)

The reason I brought up calculus is because, referring back to the original question, anyone who's ever taken a limit, an integral, or a Riemann sum, has looked at the notions of the infinite and the infintessimal that are necessary to solve the problem mathematically. In the course of calculus that I took, sequences and series were covered in the second semester, and we got all these perfectly grueling proofs and tests to demonstrate the convergence, divergence, and values of infinite summations. Like Zeno's.

The key is that infinite series and infinite summations can yield finite values. Zeno's series is the canonical example of that. You really don't need anything more complicated than calculus to answer the question. (in fact, you don't even need calculus - Archimedes essentially had it figured out eighteen centuries before calculus existed)

Now that would have reconciled the problem with Newtonian physics (which was continuous and calculus-based). I don't (but it's been a while since I took physics, and I'm not a physicist or even an engineer) understand what relativity has to do with the problem (the frames of reference do in fact move with respect to one another...the "relativistic" part of relativity, IIRC, just means that neither of them is "favored") The "cheap" way out of the problem is in quantum physics, which says that spacetime is quantized, so there's some minimum level of movement beyond which the regression no longer has meaning. But it's been a long time since I took physics (or calculus) anyway. But I honestly think that that misses the point, since the paradox deals with our purer concepts of infinity and numbers and logic and continuity.

On the epistemological ("How do we know what we know?") question...Descartes had a fucking terrible proof for this. It went essentially like this:

• Because it is possible that an evil sorcerer (representing any flaw or illusion of the mind) could be influencing my thoughts, I cannot place trust in any sensation, nor any memory (which could also be illusory)
• However, it is simply self-evident that because I think, I am. (which gets him nowhere)
• So how do we get over this radical form of doubt where nothing can be trusted? How can I prove that I'm not a brain in a vat living in the Matrix or the victim of a cruel illusionist sorcerer?
• Descartes says...because there is a benevolent, loving God and He is not a deceiver! And then he proceeds to give a series of notorious proofs on why there is a benevolent and probably Christian God up there in heaven who would not deceive us. And quite probably Descartes himself didn't believe this.[/list:u]
  
  Later philosophers (like Berkeley) abandon the idea that you could talk about reality, but simply said that you could speak meaningfully of perceptions of reality.
  
  Hume approached this from another vantage point. For instance, on the problem of induction (which is essentially the problem that "why is it that since gravity has always been known to work, is it true that gravity will always work?") he said basically "Take it on instinct or faith." Which suffices for me - after all, it's quite unprofitable (although not uninteresting) to engage in Cartesian fantasies about evil sorcerers.
  
  The problem with that (for some people, anyway) is that it requires admitting that everything fundamentally relies upon a leap of faith. That fact means that there's no real epistemological advantage to your point of view over a batshit madman in an asylum, a cult leader, or just a theist.
  
  Modern philosophers have come up with increasingly clever ways around the problem. For instance, one argument goes that a person saying "I'm a brain in a vat" (which is a stock metaphor for someone living in a simulated universe) can't say so meaningfully - it just doesn't mean anything and is semantically void (which is apparently similar to "false") because there is no empirical evidence for the brain in question to make the statement. I've personally never bought that simply because one really could put a brain in a vat, in a simulated universe, and it seems silly for a philosopher on the outside to point at the brain and say that the brain in question lacks the semantic rights to even posit what is, in fact, real.

 

[gray]

Haha, just thought I'd touch on this, theres a lot to say, but I have to go soon, anyway, about Descartes, I personally think he was aosrt of an idiot about a lot of things, especially his reasoning for a god, however, I do think he made good solid point in the rules for the direction of the mind. That being, the idea of discarding knowledge given to you and rebuilding what you know from the ground up, choosing what you are willing to take as real and as fact anf using that to find your own answers.
Also, I think therefore I am, is a little off, I think he was close, the fact of thought does not imply a self to be exact, but as many other philosophers have discussed, (I believe Locke was one) it is merely proof that 'something' exist, 'I think, therefore something is.' would be a little more accurate.

 

[Kawamura]

Haha, just thought I'd touch on this, theres a lot to say, but I have to go soon, anyway, about Descartes, I personally think he was aosrt of an idiot about a lot of things, especially his reasoning for a god, however, I do think he made good solid point in the rules for the direction of the mind. That being, the idea of discarding knowledge given to you and rebuilding what you know from the ground up, choosing what you are willing to take as real and as fact anf using that to find your own answers.
Also, I think therefore I am, is a little off, I think he was close, the fact of thought does not imply a self to be exact, but as many other philosophers have discussed, (I believe Locke was one) it is merely proof that 'something' exist, 'I think, therefore something is.' would be a little more accurate.

Isn't the whole 'cogito ergo sum' thing solipism?

And I can't say I like the idea of picking facts.

 

[Carnal]

"I think, therefore I am" is just a self-evident fact; it's only solipsism if you go on to say "...and the only other things that exist are the things in my mind." In fact Descartes argued from "Je pense, donc je suis" to a fully empiricist, materialist (and non-solipsist) position. He just needed God to do it.

 

[Kawamura]

Aaaah.

But I thought it had the connotation of 'things that think, are'. It makes no statement about non-thinking things?

And how would one use God to go the materialist, empiricist route?

 

[Carnal]

Aaaah.

But I thought it had the connotation of 'things that think, are'. It makes no statement about non-thinking things?

Yeah, the statement "I think, therefore I am," says nothing about the existence or non-existence of anything else. It's consistent with solipsism, but it's also consistent with materialism.

And how would one use God to go the materialist, empiricist route?

Descartes makes a couple arguments for the existence of a benevolent, all-powerful God. So he claims to have proven the existence of God. (and there's at least one interesting argument there) A benevolent, all-powerful God, Descartes then argues, would not be a deceiver (because that would be contrary to His benevolence), would not be an evil sorcerer, and would not allow you to be all alone as a solipsist or a brain in a vat, etc.

So, because a benevolent God would not deceive you, you can rest assured that the things you see are (more or less) real, the world you see is material.

 

[Kawamura]

Doesn't materialism now mean that everything is physical? Because that's how I learned the word.

 

[Carnal]

Right.

 

[Kawamura]

But deities aren't made of matter most of the time, no? I mean, not the sort that have survived to the more modern times.

Or were deities material back in Descartes' time?

 

[Carnal]

Well, Descartes was just arguing that the world you see and experience is physical and real.

If you'd have asked Descartes "Is God material?" I think he would have said "No," (I don't know if he crossed the question) but the existence of a nonmaterial entity (God) is not inherently inconsistent with the existence of a world that's otherwise filled with material entities.

 

[gray]

I truly think his belief of god did not fit into his philosophy at all, it would have been much better shaped if he had left that out in my opinion. Of course there is a chance this is simply my own atheistic beliefs showing themselves, but it still would have made more sense, especially as how many use Descartes views as a point for existential thinking.

 

[Carnal]

Right. Well, Descartes was writing in a time of massive religious warfare and persecution and it would have been risky to espouse a philosophy that implied atheism. He was a famously intelligent and insightful mathematician and thinker; I do doubt that he put much stock into his proofs for the existence of God.

But the ontological argument is at least interesting.

And I should mention that I've been abusing the word "materialist;" Descartes is more properly called a "dualist" with his mind/world, God/material distinctions. I meant materialist in the sense of being more materialist than solipsists and other radical skeptical theories.

 

[gray]

True, but it still seems to me as though it was pushed unnaturally into his writing, I suppose I shouldn't complain though, not much to be done about it. Indeed, he doesn't go very far into that matter as well.

A dualist may be fairly accurate, however, in this case, his two sides seem to supplement each other quite well, the scientific thought process he devised seems very likely to be a result from the spiritual or philosophical side of his view, or perhaps even the other way around. In either case, one leads into the other well enough that I can see how some people would call them one of the same.

 

[caesar]

time + distance x gravity on wall - weight of body = data corrupt)(*)(?////XXX }~````^^////>>>disc d/ error windows reformat

 

[MirrorCracked]

The problem with that (for some people, anyway) is that it requires admitting that everything fundamentally relies upon a leap of faith. That fact means that there's no real epistemological advantage to your point of view over a batshit madman in an asylum, a cult leader, or just a theist.

Modern philosophers have come up with increasingly clever ways around the problem. For instance, one argument goes that a person saying "I'm a brain in a vat" (which is a stock metaphor for someone living in a simulated universe) can't say so meaningfully - it just doesn't mean anything and is semantically void (which is apparently similar to "false") because there is no empirical evidence for the brain in question to make the statement. I've personally never bought that simply because one really could put a brain in a vat, in a simulated universe, and it seems silly for a philosopher on the outside to point at the brain and say that the brain in question lacks the semantic rights to even posit what is, in fact, real.

This is why subjective probabilities are awesome. They don't solve the problem, but they clarify the hell out of it.

My stance is this: yes, it requires a leap of faith to posit anything as certain fact. But there is one thing that we can be certain of without faith, and that is our own uncertainty. We might not be able to pin down exact probabilities on what we see, but we can get a general idea of how likely something is from our point of view.

For example, I believe that there is an extremely low probability of my being a brain in a vat. Why? Well, the prior probability, all other things being equal, of a person being a brain-in-a-vat is quite low, and I have no specific evidence that I'm an exception to the rule.

This is not the kind of probability we get when we flip a coin ten times and ask, "Will it be heads every time?" It's not nearly that exact. But it is a lot more meaningful than quibbling over whether something is a fact or it isn't. To decide whether something's a fact, set an arbitrary probability cutoff, based on context and gut instinct. If the odds are good enough, call it a fact.

From this point of view, evolution is a fact AND a theory. It's a fact, in that the evidence in favor of common descent is so overwhelming that I can set an extremely high probability on it. It's also a theory, in that new evidence can continually refine and improve our understanding of the mechanisms of evolution, trimming away our misconceptions.

In my field, we can't know how a given species evolved, because our group of organisms doesn't leave a good fossil record. But we can say how existing species are related to each other, and work out which ones shared common ancestors. The "theory" part is that we have to theorize to guess at what those ancestors looked like.